As Iran has inched closer to developing nuclear weapons capabilities, mild alarm about the mullah’s regime has given way to outright panic, reaching its apex with calls by many pundits for immediate strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, wrote last November in the LA Times, "Ahmadinejad wants to be the new Lenin. Force is the only thing that can stop him."

This harsh language, now commonplace in certain circles, is often accompanied by condemnation of those opposed to strikes as "naïve" or "soft on terror," supposing that one must either be indifferent to Iranian nuclearization or in favor of using the military to prevent it. The truth is anything but. One can quite easily believe that the Iranian threat needs to be countered, but force is an ineffective and dangerous means of addressing the problem. Though Iran can and must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, a strike under current conditions would be at best counterproductive, and at worst the gravest foreign policy mistake the United States has made in the past 60 years.

The reasons why Iran poses a threat to both regional and global security should be fairly obvious. First, Iran has extensive and well-documented ties to several terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah. Its connections with the latter are particularly worrying; not only does Hezbollah have significant capacity to ignite massive violence in the region, but it also has a number of agents inside the United States (the FBI has over 200 open cases concerning domestic Hezbollah operatives, according to ABC News).

Second, Iran’s constant threats against the United States and Israel must be taken seriously. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current president, is committed to a fervently held and literally interpreted view of Shi’a Islam’s eschatological beliefs, holding that the Mahdi – the Muslim messianic figure – will only return during a period of unprecedented suffering and death. It is impossible to divorce statements like "very soon, this stain of disgrace [Israel] will vanish from the center of the Islamic world – and this is attainable" from the theological presuppositions that underlie it. When its speaker is the president of Iran, the possibility of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East becomes too high to ignore. When combined with the potential for a greater nuclear arms race in the Middle East, ignited by fear of Iranian hegemony on the part of countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it becomes quite clear that Iran cannot be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

A common American reaction to such dangers is the call for preemptive military action. This response assumes a false connection between security threats and military force – namely, that whenever another country presents a threat to global security or American interests, the United States must use its military might to stop it. This is not the case.

Historically, most international crises have been dealt with through non-military strategies. This holds true in the case of Iran, as a number of recent developments inside the country indicate that strikes would be unnecessary and have a decidedly negative impact on both regional stability and American interests. Perhaps the most compelling reason that strikes are unnecessary is that Ahmadinejad’s political fortunes are declining. In December 2006, Ahmadinejad’s party was decisively defeated in municipal elections, winning only a paltry 3% of the national vote, a loss largely attributed to his gross mismanagement of the Iranian economy.

Ahmadinejad’s policies have led to dramatic increases in prices unaccompanied by a concomitant increase in wages, developments that disproportionately affect the lower class voters who made up the bulk of Ahmadinejad’s support in his first election. And the economic situation is not getting any better – American and United Nations sanctions have intensified the existing trends described above, forcing Iran to institute oil rationing measures which in June provoked widespread riots among those who suddenly found themselves out of gasoline. If financial pressures continue, which is likely, given a bipartisan bill to strengthen sanctions is making its way through Congress, it is possible that Ahmadinejad’s government may collapse altogether.

Even if a total breakdown of the current regime is not imminent, Iran is unlikely to develop a working nuclear bomb before a new election brings a new, more internationally conscious president. The big winners in the December elections were reformists and moderate conservatives who share the view (now widespread among Iran’s populace) that Ahmadinejad’s confrontational stance on the nuclear issue has hurt Iran far more than it has helped. Given Iran’s worsening economic fortunes, someone from one of these ideological camps will almost certainly win Iran’s 2009 presidential election, which means the driving force behind the nuclear program will be gone well before Iran can develop a working bomb.

Since Iran’s push to nuclearize seems likely to run out of steam, the negative consequences of an American strike dramatically outweigh the positive. A strike would dramatically inflame anti-Americanism throughout both the Middle East and the rest of the world. If the United States were to attack another Islamic country, the claim that al-Qaeda and its ideological bedfellows promulgate throughout the Muslim world, that America is at war with Islam, would become more credible. Popular support and recruitment rates for terrorist organizations would skyrocket, posing a major threat to both global stability and efforts to improve conditions in Iraq.

An American strike on Iran would also adversely affect U.S. relations with several key nations. A BBC poll of 25 countries found a scant 17% in favor of striking Iran. Even in the two countries whose populations are most likely to favor a strike (Iraq and Israel), only 34 and 30 percent, respectively, were in favor.

Third, a strike would have a "rally ‘round the flag" effect on the Iranian population, reviving Ahmadinejad’s flagging political fortunes by making the West appear every bit as hostile to both Iran and Islam as he claims, which could only lead to a renewed drive for nukes and an increasingly violent Middle East.

Finally, a strike on Iran could potentially spark an attack by Hezbollah operatives positioned to strike inside the United States, resulting in a widening of American military efforts, delivering Ahmadinejad precisely the type of apocalyptic conflict he desires. Given these consequences, the problems with continuing our current policy of economic sanctions pale in comparison to the pitfalls of a preemptive military assault on Iran. ● BC